Abstract-We present collaborative peer-to-peer algorithms for the problem of approximating frequency counts for popular items distributed across the peers of a large-scale network. Our algorithms are attack-resistant in the sense that they function correctly even in the case where an adaptive and computationally unbounded adversary causes up to a 1/3 fraction of the peers in the network to suffer Byzantine faults. Our algorithms are scalable in the sense that all resource costs are polylogarithmic. Specifically, latency is O(log n); the number of messages and number of bits sent and received by each peer is O(log 2 n) per item; and number of neighbors of each peer is O(log 2 n). Our motivation for addressing this problem is to provide a tool for the following three applications: worm and virus detection; spam detection; and distributed data-mining.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we address the problem of robustly computing frequency counts for popular items that are distributed across the peers of a large network. Finding frequency counts in large-scale networks is a fundamental problem; an algorithm that solves this problem can be used for many types of applications including the following.
• Worm and virus detection: Techniques for automatic generation of worm signatures based on prevalence of portions of flow payloads have already been developed in systems such as Earlybird [33] and Autograph [20] . These systems work well in practice. In fact, Netsift, a company based on the technology of the Earlybird system, was acquired by Cisco systems in 2005 for $30 Million [30] . 1 However, to best of our knowledge, there are currently no systems that can generate worm signatures in a collaborative setting, when a large number of peers in the network are malicious.
• Spam detection: The company Cloudmark maintains a system called Spamnet that is currently used by over two hundred million people [38] . Users that participate in this network mark those emails they receive that they consider spam; fingerprints are then generated for emails that are marked as spam by many users and these fingerprints are distributed to all users in the network. 2 Peer-to-peer systems have been proposed in the academic literature for collaborative spam detection [12] , [5] . However, unfortunately, none of these systems are guaranteed to work correctly in the case where a large number of peers in the network are malicious.
• Data Mining: Finding frequency counts has several important data mining applications including: finding frequent search queries [18] , [6] ; mining association rules [1] ; enabling iceberg queries [4] , [19] ; and measuring IP traffic for detecting DoS attacks and hot spots [13] . Manku and Motwani give a comprehensive account of how an algorithm for computing approximate frequency counts can be used in the latter three applications [25] .
Not surprisingly, the problem of approximating frequency counts has been studied extensively in the data mining community [6] , [25] , [26] . Moreover, there have been many results on maintaining frequency counts scalably in a distributed setting [24] , [7] , [9] , [8] . However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no results on fault-tolerant algorithms for approximating frequency counts. Moreover, even more surprisingly, there do not seem to be any results for fault-tolerant algorithms for any data mining problem. In particular, previous distributed data streaming results are neither tolerant to a certain number of peers dropping out of the network (fail-stop faults), nor tolerant to a collusion of malevolent peers that are trying to skew the results (Byzantine faults). To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to address the problem of designing scalable data streaming algorithms that are tolerant to these two types of faults.
Our motivation for studying fault-tolerant peer-to-peer algorithms for frequency counts is threefold. First, in clientserver solutions to this problem the company (e.g. Cisco or Cloudmark) charges the client, and this cost is a barrier to wide-spread use of the attack-suppression software. The need to charge seems unavoidable since the company must recoup the cost of the computational resources that it dedicates to solving the problem. Second, most companies do not have the same computational resources as can be illegally commandeered by cybercriminals: single botnets 3 have been reported to contain over 100, 000 machines [11] . A peer-to-peer approach can help overcome this mismatch. Finally, the company is a single point of vulnerability. For example, in May of 2006, several hundred junk e-mailers successfully launched an attack that disabled the websites of the anti-spam firm Blue Security [16] .
In this paper, we focus on designing fully distributed, scalable and fault-tolerant algorithms to approximate frequency counts. For simplicity of exposition, we focus initially on solving this problem on a static network. Recent results by Scheideler and Awerbuch [31] , [2] give general techniques that can be used to adapt our result to a dynamic network, i.e. one that may grow and shrink significantly in size. We also make use of the techniques in [31] to solve this problem on a dynamic network.
A. Problem Statement
We consider a model where data is distributed across n peers in a network and we wish to determine frequency counts for that data. The problem is complicated by the fact that a certain number of peers in the network are controlled by a malicious adversary. We assume this adversary is essentially omniscient in that it knows everything except for the random bits of the peers. In particular, it knows the topology of the network, the data on all peers, the content of all messages sent, and our algorithms. The adversary is adaptive in that it can delay the decision of which peers to take over. In particular, it may carefully watch the course of the algorithm, take over a critical set of peers at some point, wait for some more time, take over additional peers, and so forth until it has taken over its alloted number of peers. We note that an adaptive adversary is stronger than that considered in many recent results on scalable robust collaborative computation [21] , [17] , [22] , but in the context of designing algorithms for large-scale, open access networks, we believe it is crucial to consider an adaptive adversary. Finally, we consider two scenarios for the peers taken over by the adversary. In the fail-stop fault model, these peers simply stop working; it is as if they are removed from the network. In the harder Byzantine fault model, these peers are all controlled by the adversary and behave in a malevolent way. We will refer to the peers taken over by the adversary as bad and the remaining peers as good.
We assume that communication among uncorrupted peers can only occur over edges in the network. Communication occurs in rounds. In each round, every peer may send out messages to its neighbors in the network. The corrupted peers are assumed to have received the messages of all the uncorrupted peers before they send out their own messages. The peers are synchronized between rounds so that all messages in round i are assumed to be received before any messages in round i + 1 are sent out.
We first note that it is impossible to ensure that all peers receive exact frequency counts in our model. In particular there are two main problems. First, since we require a sparse network, each good peer will have only a polylogarithmic number of neighbors. Thus the adversary may target a certain number of good peers, take over all neighbors of these peers, and thereby keep these targeted peers from learning any of the frequent items. In other words, it is unavoidable that some peers in the network cannot learn the correct output. Second, since our network is sparse and since we require the number of messages sent by each peer to be small, it is inevitable that some good peers will not have their input items counted. Thus, we are unable to guarantee that any peers receive the exact counts. Note that our result is similar in this way to the result by Manku and Motwani [25] .
To address these two problems, we introduce two relaxation parameters and δ. Instead of requiring every peer to learn the frequent items, we require only all but an fraction of the peers to learn them. Instead of requiring frequencies to be learned exactly for all but this fraction of peers, we instead require frequencies to be learned only within a range of 1−δ to 1+δ. We can now state our main problem below.
FindFrequentCounts (S, C, M, t, , δ)
Given: A set S of n peers; a fixed constant C; integers M and t, where t/n < 1/3; and positive reals and δ. Each peer in S initially has as input up to C items; an adaptive and omniscient adversary controls t of these peers. For an item v, let c(v) be the number of good peers that have item v as an input. Output: Each peer p outputs a set of items F p with estimated frequencies c p (v) for all items v in F p . For all but n of the good peers, the following is true: 1)
Why Robust Distributed Hash Tables Fail: One naive approach to address the above frequency count problems is as follows. We maintain a robust distributed hash table (DHT) over all peers in a network. There are well-known algorithms that provably ensure the functionality of a DHT even in the case where up to a 1/3 fraction of the peers joining the DHT are controlled by an adversary (see e.g. [2] , [31] ). Assume we are maintaining such a DHT. Let h be the function hashing items to peers in this distributed hash table. Each peer in the network performs a lookup, using h, for each item it holds. Then, for each item v, the peers at location h(v) are responsible for maintaining counts of the number of unique times that item v has been looked up in the network; if the number of times item v appears is greater than M , these peers broadcast this fact to all the other peers in the network.
This naive scheme suffers from several problems. First, it suffers from load-balancing problems: those peers to which frequent items map may receive Θ(n) messages while peers to which unpopular items map will receive only Θ(1) messages. Second, it is vulnerable to attack by peer deletion: to prevent the reporting of some important frequent item v, an adversary need only take over the peers at location h(v) in the DHT. Finally, it is vulnerable to an internal attack: malicious peers can collude to artificially inflate the counts of a very large number of items so that the set of items with a count above a certain threshold is too large to be useful.
To avoid this problem, we need a scheme that ensures: 1) the responsibility for counting any particular item is distributed throughout the network; 2) malicious peers are unable to artificially inflate the counts of benign items.
B. Our Results
In this paper, we describe efficient algorithms for solving the FindFrequentCounts problem. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithms for this problem are the first that are robust to adversarial attack.
Theoretical Results: Our main theoretical result is given in the following theorem. Theorem 1.1: With high probability 4 , we are able to solve the FindFrequentCounts problem, even in the case where an adaptive adversary causes a 1/3 fraction of the peers in the network to suffer Byzantine faults. Moreover, the resource costs required by our algorithm are as follows:
• Our algorithm has latency O(log n).
• Every peer sends and receives O(log 2 n) messages.
• Every peer has O(log 2 n) neighbors in the network.
We measure latency based on the maximum number of links that any message must traverse during the course of our algorithm. We note that in the case of fail-stop faults, we can reduce the number of messages each peer must send and receive from O(log 2 n) down to O(log n).
Our results depend critically on the existence of a certain type of butterfly network, where each peer of the butterfly network consists of a subset of O(log n) peers selected uniformly at random from the set of all peers. This type of network was first described by Fiat and Saia in [14] , where it was used to enable secure storage and lookup of data items in a peer-to-peer network. Our contributions over this past result are two-fold. First, we present novel algorithms for using this network to perform collaborative computation; in contrast, the result from Fiat and Saia only used the butterfly network for communication. Thus, the distributed algorithms running on top of the network in this paper are completely different from the algorithms in [14] . Second, we design a different type of butterfly network: our new network has each supernode containing exactly the same number of peers, while the Fiat and Saia network requires only that each butterfly peer contain θ(log n) peers. Showing that our new network is still robust requires different mathematical tools than from the previous paper.
Empirical Results:
We also implement and simulate our algorithms on networks of sizes up to about 53, 000 peers. Our experiments show that we can ensure that almost all peers in the network learn the frequently occurring items with very high accuracy. Moreover, our algorithms for achieving this scale well in terms of bandwidth and latency costs.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. We review related work in Section I-C. We present our algorithm in Sections II and III. Our empirical results are in Section VI. In Section IV, we give the algorithm to reduce the number of messages sent by each peer. In Section V, we give the algorithm to reduce the number of bits sent by each peer. Finally, we conclude and give open problems in Section VII. The proofs of many of theorems and lemmas are omitted due to space constrains and they will be available in the full paper.
C. Related Work
As previously mentioned, there has been significant work in the data mining community on counting frequent items [6] , [25] , [26] , and there has also been significant work on the distributed version of this problem [24] , [7] , [9] , [8] . However, to the best of our ability, our work is the first that enables attack-resistant counting of frequent items.
In the peer-to-peer literature, there have been many results on creating attack-resistant distributed hash tables (DHTs) [2] , [31] , [15] , [27] , [14] . Unfortunately, as mentioned previously, an attack-resistant DHT does not seem to have the functionality necessary to enable attack-resistant frequency counting. Some recent work has focused on designing robust peer-to-peer systems that solve basic algorithmic problems like Byzantine agreement and leader election [21] , [17] , [22] . However, these results are not useful for our problem because: 1) they are not robust to an adaptive adversary; and 2) they do not seem useable as building blocks for enabling frequency counts.
Two major motivations for our study of the frequency count problem are worm detection and spam detection. For worm and virus detection, there have been client-server approaches such as Earlybird [33] and Autograph [20] that are based on finding frequently occurring substrings in network traffic. In addition, several peer-to-peer systems have been proposed for collaborative detection of worms and viruses [10] , [35] , [23] . However, none of these systems are robust to an attack where an adversary takes over peers in the network. For spam detection, systems have been proposed for distributed detection of spam based on: classification and filtering of email that is spam [38] , [12] , [32] , [37] ; identification and blacklisting of users that frequently send spam [28] ; counting and limiting the number of messages that any user can send [36] , [3] . We believe that for all three of these approaches to dealing with spam, a robust tool for distributed frequency counting would be invaluable.
II. OUR ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe our algorithm. For purposes of illustration, we present a naive version of our algorithm first, and then describe our more sophisticated algorithm in Section II-B.
A. Naive Algorithm
An m input butterfly network is a directed graph with log m + 1 levels, each with m nodes. An example is shown in Figure 1 . For j = 1, ..., m and i = 0, ..., log m, node j on level i links to two nodes on level i + 1: node j and node (j + 2 i ) mod 2 i . In the simple version of our protocol, if there are m peers, then each peer j is assigned to position i on every level i = 0, ..., log m of the butterfly network.
We define list p for a peer p to be a list of items and a count of each item, i.e. a list of tuples of the form {(v, num p (v)) | v is an item and num p (v) is an integer}. Initially, each p is given a list of items, each with count 1. Our naive algorithm is presented below. It makes use of the following subroutine: 
1) Analysis:
We now analyze this naive algorithm. We will make use of the following definitions in our proof: Definition 2.1: A top node is a level 0 node; a bottom node is a level log m node.
Definition 2.2:
A node is good if the peer assigned to it is good. Definition 2.3: A good path is a path through the butterfly network from a top node to a bottom node all of whose nodes are good. A path that is not good is bad.
Definition 2.4: For any fixed γ > 0, a bottom node is γ-expansive if there exist γm good paths that end at this node.
Observation 2.5: In the butterfly network,
• Each node is on exactly m simple paths from the top level to the bottom level.
• There is exactly one simple path from a top node to a bottom node.
• Each simple path from a top node to a bottom node p contributes either 0 or 1 to num p (v).
• If a good top node contains v and the path from it to a bottom node p contains all good nodes, then this path contributes 1 to num p (v). Suppose there are fewer than t bad nodes in the network, then fewer than t m paths contain bad peers. Hence, for any positive δ ≤ 1, no more than δm good peers at the bottom level receive more than t /δ messages passed along bad paths. The following lemma follows easily from Observation 2.5. 
B. Our Improved Algorithm
We now describe a way to improve the accuracy of the naive algorithm by using supernodes to reduce the number of corrupt network nodes in a network with n peers. We construct a new butterfly network with m = n/ log n nodes on each level and log n − log log n levels, where each node of the butterfly network is replaced by a set of peers of size s = k log n called a supernode. The proof of the following claim is available in the full paper.
Claim 2.7: For any constant δ, there is a constant k such that, the assignment of peers to supernodes has the following properties:
1) Each supernode contains k log n peers.
2) In the top and bottom levels, each peer is in exactly k supernodes. 3) In the middle levels, all but δ 2 t/ log n supernodes have a majority of uncorrupt peers. The protocol for the supernode network is similar to the algorithm for the standard butterfly network except that there is an initialization process and a modification to the Transfer step. In addition, as a peer may appear in several supernodes in the same level, it is important to remember that until the Final step, its actions in one supernode on a level are separate and independent of its actions in other supernodes on the same level.
• Initialize total: When the messages from level 0 supernodes are received, each peer in a level 1 supernode sums up the numbers received for each item, discarding any values not equal to 0 or 1. For subsequent levels, each peer p in each node constructs its own list for that node, then passes it on. The following subroutine is used to compile lists passed on by the set of peers in a supernode: by k. As a single peer may have several values for num(v) depending on which supernode it is in, it selects the median value as its final value. Our full algorithm is given below as Algorithm 2. Figure 1 illustrates a run of this algorithm. The numbers in the figure give an example of how frequency counts might be computed for a single item. For ease of presentation, the example in the figure assumes no Byzantine faults. 
4) Final Step: For each item v, each peer divides num(v)
by k. As a single peer may have several values for num(v) depending on which supernode it is in, it selects the median value as its final value.
1) Analysis of the Protocol Using Supernodes:
We provide a brief sketch of the analysis of our protocol by presenting key definitions and lemmas. All proofs are included in the full paper. Definition 2.8: A supernode is good if it has at least a majority of good peers. Definition 2.9: A good path is a path through the butterfly network from a top supernode to a bottom supernode all of whose supernodes are good supernodes. Definition 2.10: For any fixed γ > 0, a bottom supernode is γ-expansive if there exist γn/ log n good paths that end at this supernode. The following lemmas hold with high probability in our network with n peers, where the adversary controls t ≤ n/3 peers. Recall that s = k log n is the number of peers in each supernode in our network.
Lemma 2.12: For any δ > 0, for k and n sufficiently large, all but δn/ log n bottom supernodes are (1 − (δt/n))-expansive with probability 1 − O(1/n 2 ).
Lemma 2.13: Let δ,
be fixed constants where 0 < δ < 1/2, and > 0. Let the number of bad supernodes in middle levels be no more than δ 2 t/ log n; let all but δn/ log n bottom supernodes be (1−(δt/n))-expansive; and let k and n be sufficiently large. Then if the frequency of item v is c(v) we can ensure that there are (1 − )(n − t) good peers that can determine a frequency of v in the range
III. THE EXISTENCE OF THE SUPERNODE NETWORK
The static construction of the network is as follows. We show how the network can be dynamically maintained in the full paper.
• Let t be the number of bad peers in the network and t < n/3. Let M be the threshold such that one item can be considered as frequent item only if its number is greater than M , where M > t. We choose the parameters 0 < < 1 and 0 < δ < 1/2. As a function of , δ, we determine constant k. (See the proof part in the full paper).
• Use random permutation to construct a random bipartite graph G top with n peers on the left side and n/ log n top supernodes on the right side such that each peer has k neighbors on the right side and each top supernode has k log n neighbors on the left side.
• Use random permutation to construct a random bipartite graph G bottom with n peers on the left side and n/ log n bottom supernodes on the right side such that each peer has k neighbors on the right side and each bottom supernode has k log n neighbors on the left side.
• Use random permutation to construct a random k log nregular bipartite graph G middle with n peers on the left side and n middle supernodes on the right side such that each peer has k log n neighbors on the right side and each top supernode has k log n neighbors on the left side.
• Between two sets of peers associated with two supernodes connected in the butterfly network, we will have a full bipartite graph between the peers of these two supernodes. After the above construction, we can see that in the top and bottom levels, each peer is in exactly k supernodes, and each supernode contains k log n peers.
IV. REDUCING THE NUMBER OF MESSAGES
In this section, we sketch how to improve message passing between two successive supernodes so that only Θ(log n) messages are sent in expectation. This allows us to ensure that each peer in the network only needs to send Θ(log n) in expectation. Our techniques in this section are based on past work by Saia and Young in [29] .
Assume that h 1 is a function that maps a peer uniformly to an integer in the range 1 to log n and h 2 is a function that maps a peer to D integers selected uniformly and independently in the range 1 to log n for some constant D.
Further assume that h 1 and h 2 are known to all the peers in the network. Instead of having a full bipartite graph between two supernodes connected in the butterfly network, we will have a constant degree bipartite expander between the peers of these two supernodes(see Figure 2) .
The method of constructing the constant degree bipartite expander between two successive supernodes is as follows. For any two neighboring supernodes Q i at level i and Q i+1 at level i + 1, each peer q in Q i will link to peer p in Q i+1 if and only if h 1 (q) = h 2 (p). We can think of this process as assigning each peer q in Q i to a bin numbered between between 1 and log n whose number is given by h 1 (p), and each peer q in Q i+1 is assigned to D bins numbered between 1 and log n whose numbers are given by h 2 (p).
In the whole butterfly network, we keep the same full bipartite graph between the peers on the top level 0 supernodes and level 1 supernodes. However, we make use of the above constant degree bipartite expander between all the other neighbored supernodes. The new protocol, which we refer to as Algorithm 2.1, is exactly the same as Algorithm 2, except for the following single change. Let A and B be supernodes at level i, C be a supernode at level i + 1 that is a neighbor of A and B in the butterfly, and p be a peer in C. During the Transfer protocol, instead of p receiving messages from all peers in A and all peers in B, it receives messages only from the peers in A and the peers in B that are neighbors in the bipartite expander graphs constructed above. The peer p ignores messages received from all other peers. The rest of Algorithm 2.1 is equivalent to Algorithm 2. The following theorem follows from the results in [29] .
Theorem 4.1: Let n be the number of peers. Let t be the number of bad peers and t < n/4. Then for any fixed 0 < < 1, 0 < δ < 1/2, Algorithm 2.1 solves the FindFrequentCounts problem, even in the case where an adaptive adversary causes a up to t of the peers in the network to suffer Byzantine faults. Moreover, the resource costs required by Algorithm 2.1 are as follows.
• Latency is O(log n)
• Every peer sends and receives O(log n) messages in expectation • Every peer has O(log n) neighbors in expectation Proof: The framework of proof for the Theorem 5.1 is almost the same as that of Theorem 4.1. However, in Algorithm 2.2, for the message transmitted from any supernode Q i at level i to Q i+1 's neighbor at level i+1, it only contains the items with frequency more than (2 i δkM log n)/n. Thus for any item v, its frequency may loose during the transmission. The maximum frequency lost in the transmission is 2 i δkM log n n n 2 i log n = δkM . Hence the frequency of item v received by the good peers at the bottom level is in the
Since there are at most c distinct items in each peer, then there are at most ck log n total items in one top supernode. Then for any supernode Q at level i, the frequency of items it counts is at most 2 i ck log n. Note that the error tolerance threshold for Q is (2 i δkM log n)/n. Thus there are at most (2 i ck log n)/(2 i δkM log n/n) = cn/(δM ) distinct items that can be transmitted to Q's neighbor. Since the bits of one item and its frequency is at most O(log n), the number of bits transmitted from Q to its neighbor is at most (cn/(δM ))O(log n) = O( n log n M ). So the total number of bits transmitted in Algorithm 2.2 is no more than
), where D is the constant defined in Section IV. For each peer, it only needs to send O(
) bits in expectation. Since M is Θ(n), each peer only needs to send O(log 2 n) bits.
V. REDUCING THE NUMBER OF BITS
In Algorithm 2.1, the size of the messages increase as we progress down the butterfly network. We now analyze the number of bits sent in Algorithm 2.1. If the total number of items is some constant, then the maximum number of bits of any message is O(log n). Thus in this case, each peer sends O(log n) * O(log n) = O(log 2 n) bits. However, consider the following worse case. Assume that initially, any peer in the network has at most some fixed constant c items on it and every item has a constant number of bits. Then in each top supernode, there are at most ck log n distinct items contained. Consider the messages generated at level i for all i = 1, . . . , log n − log log n levels of the butterfly network. A message generated at level i can contain at most (2 i ck) log n items and their frequencies. Thus, the number of bits in one message can be O(2 i log n). Since for any level i, the number of messages transmitted from level i to level i + 1 is O(n), the number of bits transmitted from level i to level i + 1 is O(2 i n log n). The total number of bits transmitted from the top level to bottom level is thus O(n 2 log n). Thus each peer sends O(n log n) bits in this worse case. In this section, we try to reduce the number of bits sent to polylogarithmic even in the worse case.
A. General Distribution and Constant Items Stored in Each Peer
In this section, we handle the case that the items in the network follows any general distribution and each peer contains only constant distinct items. We can reduce the number of bits transmitted if we allow the user to introduce an error tolerance threshold during transmission. In particular, instead of estimating counts in the range [c(v) − δt, c(v)+(1+δ)t], we will instead provide estimates that are in the range
Therefore, we need to improve Algorithm 2.1: for any peer at level i, after receiving two messages from its neighbors in the two supernodes above, it will generate a new message containing only a part of items with frequency more than an error tolerance threshold other than generating a new message containing all the items and their frequency in the two messages. In this way, we can reduce the number of bits during Algorithm 2.1. The crucial point is to find a reasonable error tolerance threshold.
The construction of the butterfly network is the same as the one in Section IV. For any supernode Q at level i, we choose the error tolerance threshold for this supernode is (2 i δkM log n)/n, so that only items with frequency more than (2 i δkM log n)/n can be transmitted to Q's neighbors at level i+1. The protocol for the supernode network is similar to the Algorithm 2.1 for butterfly network with supernode except that we modify the function sum.
The new subroutine sum(list q , list r ) is defined as follows:
• sum(list q , list r ): for a peer p in a supernode Q at level i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ log n − log log n, it re-
The new algorithm, which we call Algorithm 2.2 is equivalent to Algorithm 2.1 except it makes use of this new subroutine sum. The properties of Algorithm 2.2 are described in Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.1: Let n be the number of peers. Let t be the number of bad peers and t < n/3. Let M be the threshold such that one item can be considered as frequent item only if its frequency is greater than M , where M > t and M is Θ(n). Then for any fixed 0 < < 1, 0 < δ < 1/2, we are able to solve the FindFrequentCounts problem, even in the case where an adaptive adversary causes a 1/3 fraction of the peers in the network to suffer Byzantine faults. Moreover, the resource costs required by our algorithm are as follows.
• Algorithm 2.2 has latency O(log n).
• Every peer sends and receives O(log n) messages.
• Every peer has O(log n) neighbors in the network.
• Every peer sends O(log 2 n) bits.
VI. EXPERIMENTS In this section, we present empirical results for our algorithm. Our goal is to measure the tradeoff between (1) resource costs: namely, total bits sent and latency; and (2) accuracy: the fraction of frequent items that are not properly identified as such.
A. Experimental Setup
Our focus is on data streams where frequency counts follow a Zipf distribution, i.e. the frequency of the i-th most popular item occurs is proportional to i −z for some fixed value z. Numerous studies on real-world data show that frequency counts typically follow such a distribution, with the exponent z usually in the range from 2 to 3. In our experiments, we consider values of z ranging from 1 to 5. In every experiment, we set the threshold M , that determines whether or not an item is frequent to be t + 1. This is the smallest threshold possible, since if M ≤ t, it is possible for the adversarially controlled peers to overwhelm the network by generating essentially an unbounded number of frequent items.
In all of our experiments, we consider the case where the total number of distinct items is 10n, where n is the number of peers in the network, and we consider values of n up to 53, 248. To illustrate, consider the case where n = 53, 248 and z = 2. Then, the number of times the k-th most frequent item occurs is
. Thus, the frequency with which the most popular item occurs is about 61%, the frequency of the second most popular item is about 15%, and the frequency of the third most popular item is about 6.8%.
Unfortunately, for typical values of z, the number of items that occur a large number of times is very small. Thus, to more effectively test our algorithms, we add an additional 1, 000 "hidden" items that occur with frequency distributed uniformly at random between M and n, and which are distributed uniformly at random on the peers in the network. These hidden items could represent spam or the signature of an epidemic process. Our experiments were performed using a simple variant of Algorithm 2, described in the full paper, that reduces the total number of bits sent via a thresholding function. The basic idea is to throw out items with frequency counts that fall below a certain threshold, where the threshold increases exponentially as the messages proceed down the butterfly network. We emphasize that although the total number of distinct items is only 10n + 1000, the number of occurrences of items is actually much higher, since a single distinct item can occur on a large number of peers.
We assume the following strategy for the adversary. The adversary takes over supernodes starting at the top left of the butterfly network and moving right and then down. While the adversary still has peers that it can take over, it takes over a majority of the peers in each supernode in order to control the entire supernode. In this way, the adversary will be able to control at least O(n/ log n) supernodes. We experimented with various other simple adversarial strategies (e.g. targeting random peers, targeting random supernodes) and this seemed to be the most effective one for the adversary.
B. Results
Our empirical results are shown in Figures 3, 4 , 5 and 6. Both plots in Figure 3 and Figure 4 , give results for Algorithm 2 with networks of size n = 53, 248; in both plots the y-axis measures the fraction of frequent items that are not correctly identified as such by the algorithm. The plot The max number of hops that a message traverses as a function of n The number n of total nodes The max number of hops that a message traverses Figure 6 . Time latency for Algorithm 2 in Figure 3 gives results when k = 4 (recall that k is the robustness parameter for Algorithm 2) as the exponent z of the Zipf distribution varies from 1 to 5. The fraction of nodes controlled by the adversary, t, forms the contours in this plot. As expected, higher values of z result in fewer errors, all else being equal. Moreover, our algorithm seems to do quite well even for moderately high values of z. The plot in Figure 4 gives results for z = 2, when robustness parameter, k, varies on the x-axis. Again different values of t form the contours in the plot. We note that z = 2 is smaller than we might expect to see in practice. However, with larger values of z, our experiments showed that essentially no frequent items are missing, so we used a smaller value of z to show the tradeoff between k and the error rate.
Both plots in Figure 5 and Figure 6 give results for Algorithm 2 with t = n/8 and z = 2. The plot in Figure 5 shows how the total number of bits sent varies with n (x-axis), and k (contours). Without thresholding, for n = 53, 248, our analysis predicts that the number of bits sent by a node would be roughly 48 * 532480 * k 2 log 2 n. This follows since the maximum frequency for an item is n, and we assume each items needs 32 bits to be identified, so the total bits to identify and count an item is log n + 32 = 48. This is multiplied by the total number of items that are counted and by the k 2 log 2 n factor that comes from our algorithm. For k = 4, the above formula predicts about 9 * 10 9 bits will be sent without thresholding, while our experiments show about 5 * 10
7 bits or about 6 megabytes being sent per processor with thresholding. By way of comparison, a one hour voice call on Skype requires from 10 to 56 megabytes [34] . In some situations, the bandwidth cost of our algorithm may be significant. Some techniques to further reduce bandwidth, at the expense of decreased accuracy, are available in the full paper. The plot inFigure 6 shows the relationship between the latency of our algorithm (number of hops) and the parameter n. The plot in Figure 6 is exactly same for different k. For this plot, our theoretical results predict a latency that is logarithmic in network size and this is also approximately matched by our empirical results.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have described distributed algorithms for approximating frequency counts of popular items in a large-scale peerto-peer network. Our algorithms are attack-resistant in the sense that they functions correctly even if a malicious adversary controls up to a constant fraction of the peers in the network. Our algorithms are also scalable in terms of latency and bandwidth costs. We have proven that our algorithms are correct, and have presented empirical evidence showing that their resource costs scale well.
Several open problems remain including the following. First, can we further reduce bandwidth costs without sacrificing accuracy? Second, can we use the techniques described in this paper for designing robust distributed algorithms for other computational problems? Finally, would it be possible to deploy these algorithms to solve the problem of approximating frequency counts in an actual distributed network?
